Neuroethics and International Biolaw

That’s me again, trying to justify myself… I suppose that the grand difficulty when applying laws or The Declaration to neuroscientific issues comes from the idea that human beings are just a combination of physical and biological factors. That we may add certain properties to these physical and biological aspects but those adds would come from our  environment, our  moral values, motives and personal wishes – all imposed features, something that we shouldn’t be able to choose. That’s YOU! Not a random entity. Then, how an individual may be considered responsible for their actions if they can’t really have a control of their actions? Where does the concept of free will fit in? Aren’t free will just a command coming from my brain? But one can possibly consider some components that would resists to this supposed irresistible force in case the individual possess some rational strength to intervene. And these components should be taken in consideration. That’s why the psychopathy diagnose is not considered an attenuating in criminal judgments; it’s taken that those individuals are possessed by conscience of their actions. I suppose this illusional free will issue is really relevant, e.g. the prefrontal cortex when damaged by a lesion or a tumor may lead the person to have moral and ethical problems or even it’s decreased metabolism may lead to a violent behaviour, however, it’s not excused by a criminal or violent action even being an important factor in a criminal context.  The article 5 is about individual autonomy. But For persons who are not capable of exercising autonomy, special measures are to be taken to protect their rights and interests. Which is the case. So, the article 7 and 8 should be applied and finally article 27 should provide the complementary interests of public safety, for the investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, for the protection of public health or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Although, I must confess that I sometimes feel that the act should be judged only by its effects in others rather than the motives and intentions of the agent. :X