Kevin Sauvé – Answers to Week One Questions
September 16th, 2009 at 13:09If we are asking if it is appropriate to begin a dialogue on a neurocentric age, then my answer is yes. If the question is asking if we are living in a neurocentric age, then my answer is that it depends. (Question 1)
To begin a foreword-thinking dialogue regarding the role of neuroscience in our everyday lives is crucial. Neuroscience is going to continue to develop more sophisticated technology with capabilities – or believed potentials – that far exceed what we are familiar with today. The ability to assess the brain’s role in subjective experiences (such as the perception of free-will, choice, sympathy, altruism, bias, prejudice, etc.) is evidently becoming more possible each passing year. It is important to continue the discussion of the implications of such technology on ethical, social, cultural, legal and political values.
As a journalist I believe that more than ever, society needs to be informed on the true potentials of such technology. Even now we have reports that fMRI can “read minds” and “detect lies” – such misinformation has the power not only to mislead the public but also to jeopardize public trust and the credibility of valid neuroscience. The power of brain-images – both on patients following clinical applications and the general public in news publications/broadcasts – has been shown to influence the perception of one’s self as measured by “risk” (Article by Daniel Z. Buchman, In Press), as well as to skew public opinions on the validity of neuroscience research (McCabe D. & Castel A. (2007). Seeing is believing: the effect of brain images on judgments of scientific reasoning. Cognition.). The development of brain technologies as well as an increased interest by the public in neuroscience research is directing us toward “a neurocentric age” and yes, it is very important to “start talking about a neurocentric age”. But in fact, the discussion has already begun.
However, we are not living in a neurocentric age, in my opinion. Much of the conscious and unconscious beliefs the majority of individuals hold are not in alignment with a belief that “we are our brains” (Question 3a), despite the fact that, depending on the definition of self, we can see the self as a product of the brain. Neuroscientists and neuro/bio/cognitive/evoultionary psychologists may see us as such – and from this perspective it would be difficult to see when we were ever not living in a neurocentric era – but I do not believe that this is a view held by the majority of the world, which I think would be a requirement for a worldview with neuroscience at the helm.
So the question remains, are neuroessentialists correct in asserting that we are our brains? As I already mentioned briefly, this really depends on what we perceive the “self” to be. (I will not touch upon theocentric perspectives as I believe that it is obvious what view is held here). From a secular western biological perspective, that the self is the body-mind, then yes we are in fact our brains. Habitual patterns of cognition as well as the process by which we sense, perceive, appreciate, reject, contemplate, remember, relate to others, and coordinate our behavior following guidance from these processes are all evidently attributable to neuronal activity.
However, neuroscientists have yet to confirm – and this question remains at the forefront of debate – consciousness as a neurobiological process. In fact, many argue that we cannot use reductionism to understand consciousness but must acknowledge systemic metabolic and ontological processes of the entire organism in order to truly understand consciousness as an emergent property of the chemical processes of life itself. This is a similar view held by many traditionally Eastern philosophical systems, such as Buddhism, where consciousness is seen as absolute identity. The “self” in such cases is still seen as a product of brain activity, but indeed, this is not who or what we are, but is only an illusion.
All bioethical issues are certainly not ‘nothing more than neuroethical issues’ (Question 3b), regardless of whether we are our brains, unless of course, by being a brain it is meant that the body and the world is a figment of the imagination. Many bioethical issues – for example: the allocation of scarce resources, respect for the choices of future generations, end of life decisions (outside of personhood and agency), the value of life, the difference between killing and letting die, even practical ethics such as doctor-patient relationships and research ethics – may be dealt with in neuroethics, but are not its exclusive domain and have been contemplated in bioethics for millennia outside of a formal neuroethics discipline. It could be argued (but not by me) that neuroethics is really just bioethics. Even questions of climate change and human impact on the environment on other species can be considered issues of bioethics that are not directed, specifically, to neuroethics.
It is evident however, that neuroethics has a very important role to play in society today outside of traditional bioethics, especially with the emergence of new neuroscientific techniques. Brain imaging devices such as functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) have not only allowed us to “tap into” the brain and subjective processes, as we have never been able to before, but, in the process, are generating questions surrounding who we believe ourselves to be and how we relate to the world. As well, brain imaging is leading to incidental discoveries and new labels for brain disorders previously unknown or undefined. Deep brain stimulation and other technologies are generating valid questions about the nature of freewill and what it means to be human (e.g. am I any less of a human if I interface with a machine?). And drugs developed for neuropathology are finding new uses within healthy populations (e.g. Ritalin, MPH, selective serotonin-reuptake inhibitors, etc.)
Aside: I believe that we can still flourish and be authentic even with nootropics (i.e. brain drugs), but the ethical questions that do remain in my mind are issues of safety and efficacy, access to resources and issues of justice, and freedom from coercion – hopefully we will deal with this question in greater detail at a later point.
All of the above contributions of cognitive neuroscience are paralleled by questions from neuroethics by generating questions that ask what is right and wrong, good and bad, fair and unfair, moral and immoral about how we view, value, assess, treat, and manipulate the brain. In fact, the position for neuroethics is directly at the intersection of neuroscience and society (Question 2 and 4).
Tags: 1st week, cognitive enhancement, cognitive neuroscience, freewill, identity and the brain, kevinsauve, neuroethics, neuroscience and ethics, nootropics
September 16th, 2009 at 1:56 pm
Hello Kevin,
I think I agree with everything you said.
Regarding your mention of reductionism and consciousness, that’s a good point. It’s important not to assume an oversimplified model of consciousness which is going to easily yield up all its secrets to upcoming advances in brain imaging technology, for example. I think a good analogy for this is the recent history of genetics. When we were on the verge of rapid advances in decoding human DNA some years ago there was a lot of very optimistic speculation about soon-to-arrive medical advances, for example, which by and large haven’t materialized yet at nearly the rate some people were expecting. I’ve read that this was because human variations were not so closely tied to simple genetic variations, (e.g. single-nucleotide polymorphism), as some had expected. Its possible that similar situation could obtain in neurology, where the causal connections between variations in consciousness and observable physical phenomenon turn out to be not so forthcoming as some may now anticipate.
BTW, regarding consciousness, are you familiar with the Global Consciousness Project? ( http://noosphere.princeton.edu/index.html )
Also, BTW, I just noticed this book recently out on Ethical Issues in Neurology, ( http://www.amazon.com/Ethical-Issues-Neurology-James-Bernat/dp/0781790603/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1253125717&sr=1-1 )
Thanks for the post.
Cheers,
Ken
September 16th, 2009 at 2:21 pm
Hi Ken,
Thank you for these resources, especially the link to the Global Consciousness Project. I hadn’t seen this before; it’s fascinating.
Cheers,
Kevin
September 16th, 2009 at 9:40 pm
I will strive to make my comments short and to the point. I very well may fail.
In philosophy there is an important concept called “underdetermination” — basically just a fancy word for ambiguity of data/phenomena. The idea is that phenomena can be interpreted in a number of ways and consciousness is no exception — we can choose to think of ourselves as our brains, or we can, as some do, say that the brain is a critical piece of the “self” by but no means reducible thereto. I think an interesting pragmatic question is this: does it make a practical difference as to how we see ourselves??? Again, Bandura on self-perception and self-efficacy on point. There is also an interesting literature on possible selves and motivation. If people interpret neuroscience as showing there is no free will — how does this affect motivation. N.B. experiments have detected that there is electrical activity in the brain that precedes the feeling of conscious will. And here is the point about underdetermination: some say AHA this proves there is no free will because the “unconscious” chooses before the conscious feels the choice! Others disagree (the will always has a “veto power” is the standard counterargument) One question is which view induces and motivates the human being to engage in activities that provide meaning and purpose to that individual.
September 19th, 2009 at 5:41 am
Your point about the influence of the ‘brain as self’ hypothesis on moral responsibility is an good one. Perhaps freewill could evaporate under objective scrutiny but I’m not sure that individual motivation would necessarily dissolve if we credited the brain with generating our sense of self, even if it turned out that the feeling of ‘freedom’ was a result of unconscious neural activity. I think that it’s important that we are open to, and acknowledge, such an interpretation if we observe it in earnest. Perhaps that willingness may actually be liberating as knowledge itself influences brain structure and physiology!
I’m also not sure that people would lose a sense of responsibility for themselves in such a situation, and in fact, would probably continue to operate as though they had agency regardless of what neuroscience had to say. Where it becomes crucial though, is within political/legal systems where outside influences are responsible for judging behavior and subjective motivation. If a jury sees a serial killer as a brain, perhaps that individual is just ‘unwell’ and not actually morally responsible. Retribution would become unjust and prisons would turn into hospitals.
November 20th, 2010 at 1:38 am
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